Cooper v. Schriro - example of conclusory allegation of retaliation

The Case: Cooper v. Schriro (8th Cir. 1999), The Court cites Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8thCir. 1989) (recognizing right to petition for redress of grievances under established prison grievance system);

and Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (threat to prisoner may state claim of denial of access to courts if threats were intended to intimidate inmate from exercising that right), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979).

However, the Court found that in this instance Cooper did not state a claim as to superintendent Michael Kemna based on his allegation that he "belie[ved]" Kemna ordered officers to file false violations against him in retaliation for his grievances. See Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (speculative and conclusory allegations cannot support retaliation claim).

Hudspeth v Figgins - threat of retaliation actionable - regardless of the success of the threat

Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1978). Stating

Once judicial proceedings have been commenced, the state may not punish a prisoner for having sought judicial remedies. Russell v. Oliver, 552 F.2d 115, 116 (4th Cir. 1977); Haymes v. Montanye, 547 F.2d 188(2d Cir. 1976).

A threat of physical harm to a prisoner if he persists in his pursuit of judicial relief is as impermissible as a more direct means of restricting the right of access to the courts. Nor is it necessary that the prisoner succumb entirely or even partially to the threat. It is enough that the threat was intended to impose a limitation upon the prisoner's right of access to the court and was reasonably calculated to have that effect. See Lingo v. Boone, 402 F.Supp. 768, 775 (N.D.Cal.1975).